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ONCE IS ENOUGH: THE NEED TO APPLY THE FULL 
ELLERTH/FARAGHER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN 
SINGLE INCIDENT AND INCIPIENT HOSTILE WORK 
ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS  
By Charles W. Garrison+ 
 In 1964, the House of Representatives held what today would be considered 
a historic debate on an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
The amendment proposed adding “sex” as a protected class under the bill, 
making it illegal for employers to discriminate on the basis of gender.1  Yet, 
the historic nature of the amendment was not apparent to the representatives at 
the time, and one Justice Department official remarked, “They thought it was a 
joke.  They didn’t think there was any discrimination against women that 
mattered.  They were laughing down on the floor as they were talking about 
it.” 2   Despite the levity in the House, “sex” was added to Title VII and 
remained in the final bill.3  In the mid-1970s, courts determined that sexual 
                                                 
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of American, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A., 2004, Bates College.  The author wishes to thank Professor Suzette Malveaux for her 
guidance and assistance during this process.  Additionally, many thanks to the members of the 
Catholic University Law Review for their contributions to this Comment.  Finally, a special 
thanks to my family and friends for their love and support, especially to my father for his years of 
providing me with writing advice and “constructive criticism.” 
 1. CARRIE N. BAKER, THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL HARASSMENT 14–15 
(2008). The amendment to add “sex” as a protected class was offered by Representative Howard 
Smith, an opponent of the Civil Rights Act, whom many argue proposed the amendment as a 
“congressional joke” designed to defeat the bill.  ABIGAIL C. SAGUY, WHAT IS SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT? FROM CAPITOL HILL TO SORBORNE 28 (2003).  Courts have acknowledged this 
motive in discussing the legislative history of Title VII.  See e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining 
Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (“This Court . . . is well aware that the sex 
discrimination prohibition was added to Title VII as a joke by the notorious civil rights opponent 
Howard W. Smith.  But the joke backfired on Smith when the amendment was adopted . . . .”) 
aff’d, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).  The Supreme Court has used more muted terms, but noted 
that “[t]he prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last 
minute on the floor of the House . . . and we are left with little legislative history to guide us in 
interpreting of the Act’s prohibition against discrimination based on ‘sex.’”  Meritor Sav. Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986).  See generally Robert C. Bird, More than a 
Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look a the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 137 (1997) (providing a discussion of the 
rationale for the inclusion of the amendment and an argument that the conventional wisdom 
surrounding it is incorrect). 
 2. BAKER, supra note 1, at 15. 
 3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TITLES VII AND IX OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 
3213–32–32 (1964) (debating and adopting the Smith Amendment); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 
703, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)). 
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harassment was a form of sex discrimination prohibited under Title VII.4  In 
the subsequent decades, Title VII has become one of the most effective tools in 
combating sexual harassment in the workplace.5  Even so, courts struggle to 
adopt clear standards for determining what constitutes sexual harassment and 
when an employer should be liable for sexual harassment under Title VII.6 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees from workplace 
discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.7   Title 
VII accomplishes this important objective by allowing employees who suffer 
discrimination to recover damages or other remedies from their employers.8  
Although the term “sexual harassment” does not appear in the text of Title VII, 
employers can be held vicariously liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment 
of an employee.9  
Broadly, courts recognize two categories of sexual harassment as actionable 
under Title VII, triggering various degrees of employer liability.10  The most 
blatant category, sometimes called “quid pro quo” harassment, where an 
employer conditions an employees job status or takes a tangible employment 
                                                 
 4. See infra Part I.B.; Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C Cir. 1977), is generally 
regarded as the first appellate-level case recognizing sexual harassment as a form of sex 
discrimination actionable under Title VII.  SAGUY, supra note 1, at 31 (2003).  In Costle, a 
woman brought a Title VII sex discrimination claim against her employer after she was fired for 
refusing the sexual advances of her superior. Costle, 561 F.2d at 984-85.  The D.C. Court of 
Appeals stated that at “no time during our intensive study of this case have we encountered 
anything to support the notion that employment conditions summoning sexual relations between 
employees and superiors are somehow exempted from the coverage of Title VII . . . [A]gainst this 
backdrop, we cannot doubt that Title VII intercepts the discriminatory practice charged here.”  Id. 
at 994–95.  In the same year, the Third and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal also recognized 
sexual harassment as actionable under Title VII.  See Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 
F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Bus. Prods., 568 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir. 
1977). 
 5. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, PRIMER ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1 
(1992) (describing Title VII as “[c]hief” among the laws prohibiting sexual harassment); Eileen 
Goldsmith, Sexual Harassment: Legal Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYC. OF SOCIAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL SCIS., 13982, 13982 (Paul B. Bates and Neil J. Smelse eds., 2001) (“Title VII 
remains the primary legal weapon against sexual harassment in the United States . . . .”). 
 6. See e.g., Aric G. Elsenheimer, Agency and Liability in Sexual Harassment Law: Toward 
a Broader Definition of Tangible Employment Actions, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1636 (2005).  It 
has been suggested that the court’s struggle in defining the scope of employer liability under Title 
VII stems from a lack of definition of unlawful harassment.  See GAVIN S. APPLEBY, 
HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION AND OTHER WORKPLACE LANDMINES 61 (2008). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (declaring that a civil action may be brought against the 
respondent named in the charge by the “person claiming to be aggrieved” or by any person whom 
the charge claims was aggrieved by the alleged “unlawful employment practice”). 
 9. CAROL M. MERCHASIN, MINDY H. CHAPMAN & JEFF POLINSKY, CASE DISMISSED! 
TAKING YOUR HARASSMENT PREVENTION TRAINING TO TRIAL 4-5 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing 
situations in which courts have held employers liable for sexual harassment). 
 10. JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30253, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 11 (2008). 
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action based on the employee’s submission to a supervisor’s harassing 
actions. 11   The United States Supreme Court has held that employers are 
strictly liable for harassment that results in a tangible employment action.12  
The second category of sexual harassment called a “hostile work environment 
claim” occurs when no action is taken against the employee, but the 
supervisor’s harassment is so severe or pervasive that it makes the workplace 
“hostile” or “abusive” for the employee.13  
In 1998, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, the Supreme Court issued two rulings regarding employer liability 
in hostile work-environment actions.14  In both cases, the Court held that an 
employer is liable for hostile work-environment claims created by a 
supervisor’s sexual harassment. 15   However, the Court limited employer 
liability when no tangible employment action is taken, where the employer 
proves, “(a) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any harassing behavior, and (b) the plaintiff employee unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided 
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”16  Although this affirmative 
defense appears straightforward,17  circuit courts are split as to whether an 
employer must prove both elements of the Ellerth and Faragher affirmative 
defense in two situations: (1) incipient, or early-stage, hostile  
work-environment claims in which an employer remedies the harassment after 
notification; and (2) single-incident situations in which one act of harassment 
creates a hostile work environment.18 
Less than one year after Ellerth and Faragher, in Indest v. Freeman 
Decorating, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district 
court’s dismissal of a hostile work-environment claim because the employer 
took prompt and proper action to address the harassment after the employee 
                                                 
 11. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (1980) (defining the category as harassment in which 
“submission to or rejection of [the unwelcomed sexual] conduct . . . is used as the basis for 
employment decisions affecting” the employee); see also FEDER, supra note 10, at 11. 
 12. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76 (1986) (Marshall, J. concurring) 
(noting unanimity among federal appellate courts that employers should be strictly liable for  
quid pro quo harassment); see also Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998) (“[A] 
tangible employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the 
employer.”); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790–91 (1998) (quoting BARBARA 
LINDEMAN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 776 (3d ed. 1996)) 
(“[C]ourts hold employers ‘automatically liable’ in quid pro quo cases because the ‘supervisor’s 
actions . . . are deemed as a matter of law those of the employer.’”). 
 13. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); see FEDER, supra note 10, at 11. 
 14. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764–65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790–91. 
 15. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764–65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790–91. 
 16. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765–66; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 17. See, e.g., Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 796 (5th Cir. 1999) 
[hereinafter Indest II] (Weiner, J., specially concurring) (characterizing the Ellerth and Faragher 
rule as “remarkably straightforward and perfectly consistent”). 
 18. See infra Parts I.E, I.F. 
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complained.19  The court held that Ellerth and Faragher did not control in 
cases involving an “incipient hostile environment” when the employer took 
timely action to “nip [the] hostile environment in the bud.” 20   Stated 
differently, the Fifth Circuit devised a new rule for incipient  
hostile-environment claims, allowing employers to escape liability by 
satisfying only the first element of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.21 
Similarly, in McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit held that an employer does not have to establish the second 
element of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in a hostile  
work-environment case stemming from a single incident of harassment.22  The 
court analogized the application of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to 
single-incident cases as “trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.”23   
Despite the Fifth and Eighth Circuit precedent, other circuits have faithfully 
applied both elements of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.  In 
Harrison v. Eddy Potash Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
upheld a district court’s use of the full Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in 
a hostile work-environment case, despite an employer’s prompt action to 
redress the harassment.24  Last year, in Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held that an 
employer must establish both elements of the affirmative defense in a  
single-incident hostile work-environment case.25  
This Comment examines the appropriate application of the Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense to hostile work-environment cases involving incipient and 
single incident sexual harassment by a supervisor.  Part I provides an overview 
of employer liability under Title VII and a history of sexual harassment 
liability by examining statutory provisions, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) guidance, and Supreme Court precedent.  Part I also 
explains the development of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense and 
describes the current circuit split on its application in single incident and 
incipient hostile work-environment claims.  Part II analyzes this circuit split by 
evaluating the decisions in light of Ellerth and Faragher, policy concerns, and  
Title VII’s legislative history and underlying policy goals.  This Comment 
argues that the Tenth Circuit and Northern District of Indiana’s application of 
                                                 
 19. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc. 164 F.3d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Indest 
I]. 
 20. Id. at 265–67. 
 21. Id. at 267 (stating that a company’s prompt response to a harassment complaint relieves 
it of liability). 
 22. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 771–72 (8th Cir 2004) (noting that the 
Supreme Court did not “change course” in its sexual harassment jurisprudence). 
 23. Id. at 771. 
 24. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1027 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming the 
district court’s use of jury instructions based on both elements of the Ellerth/Faragher defense). 
 25. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 946 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
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both elements of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense better serves Title 
VII’s goal of deterrence by encouraging employers and employees to take 
proactive steps to prevent harassment.  Part III contends that incentivizing 
reporting of harassment is even more imperative in the current job market, as 
employees feel increased pressure to endure harassment rather than to risk 
losing or leaving their jobs.  Further, this Comment urges the Supreme Court to 
resolve this circuit split by finding that both elements of the Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense should govern single-incident and incipient hostile  
work-environment claims, as this approach best preserves Title VII as a strong 
tool to fight workplace discrimination.  
I.  DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
A.  Title VII and Employer Liability 
The prohibition of employment discrimination under Section 703 of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to afford economic 
opportunity to African Americans and other minority groups that had long 
been denied jobs due to their minority status. 26   The statute prohibits an 
employer or “any agent of such person” 27 from discriminating in hiring or 
firing or discriminating “with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment” based on the employee’s “race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.”28  
Courts recognize that Title VII has dual goals of (1) deterring 
discrimination, and (2) redressing harm by requiring violators to compensate 
victims of discrimination. 29   Title VII seeks to deter discrimination by 
imposing on employers “civil liability for civil rights violations.”30  Implicit in 
this philosophy lies the belief that employers will take proactive steps to create 
a workplace free of discrimination if faced with potential civil liability.31 
Because of the inclusion of “agents,” courts have looked to basic common 
law agency doctrine for guidance when determining employer liability for 
                                                 
 26. See 110 CONG. REC. 6547 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (reciting statistics that 
documented the effect of discrimination of nonwhites in the workplace and noting that “no civil 
rights legislation would be complete unless it dealt with this problem”). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006). 
 28. § 2000e-2. 
 29. Id.; see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (noting 
that deterrence and victim compensation are two purposes of Title VII); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 
466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984) (“The dominant purpose of the Title, of course, is to root out 
discrimination in employment.”). 
 30. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Civil Remedies: Vicarious 
Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 756 
(1999). 
 31. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (“The purposes underlying Title 
VII are similarly advanced where employers are encouraged to adopt antidiscrimination policies 
and to educate their personnel on Title VII’s prohibitions.”). 
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discriminatory acts by an employee.32  Of particular importance in liability 
questions is the agency doctrine of respondeat superior, which holds an 
employer vicariously liable for “torts committed by employees while acting 
within the scope of their employment.” 33  Additionally, an employer can be 
held liable even when employees commit a tort outside the “scope of their 
employment” if the employer negligently or recklessly allows the action, or if 
the employee’s conduct is aided by his agency relation with the employer.34  
Despite Title VII’s twin goals of deterrence and compensation,35 the statute 
remains silent on the scope of vicarious liability for employers.36  In hostile 
work-environment cases where a supervisor discriminates against or sexually 
harasses an employee but the employee’s job status is not altered, the 
employer’s connection to the harassment is more attenuated because the 
supervisor did not overtly exert his or her supervisory power by taking 
employment action against the employee. 37   In these cases, courts have 
struggled to develop clear rules for employer liability.  This uncertainty was 
especially prevalent in the decade following the passage of Title VII when 
women first tried to use Title VII to combat sexual harassment at work.38  
                                                 
 32. See e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (declining to give a 
definitive rule on employer liability, but noting that Congress wanted the courts to look to 
common agency principles for guidance). 
 33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). The Restatement defines agency as 
“the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another 
person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s 
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”  Id. § 1.01.  For instance, 
when a supervisor, authorized by the employer to make decisions that affect an employee’s job 
status, fires an employee based on the employee’s sex, the employer can be held vicariously 
liable.  See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 75–77 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing the Court’s 
application of strict liability in tangible employment-action cases). 
 34. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05(1) (“A principal who conducts an 
activity through an agent is subject to liability for harm to a third party caused by the agent’s 
conduct if the harm was caused by the principal’s negligence in selecting, training, retaining, 
supervising, or otherwise controlling the agent.”). 
 35. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (explaining that employer 
liability for discrimination not only compensates the victim, but it also bolsters Title VII’s 
broader goal of ending workplace discrimination).  Broader liability encourages employers to 
ensure that there is no discrimination and also allows victims of workplace discrimination to seek 
compensation from the “deeper pocket[ed]” employers rather than the individual employee who 
actually violates the law.  See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 757. 
 36. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 762 (speculating that this silence is likely due to 
the fact that Congress designed Title VII with overtly discriminatory employment practices in 
mind, such as hiring or firing due to race, where establishing employer liability would not be 
problematic). 
 37. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 76–77 (Marshall, J., concurring).  This position is the subject of 
some debate, as a supervisor is also tasked with oversight and regulation of the workplace, 
thereby enabling a supervisor’s actions to create a hostile environment.  Id. 
 38. SAGUY, supra note 1, at 28–30. 
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B. Establishing Sexual Harassment as a Form of Actionable Discrimination 
Under Title VII 
The unprecedented influx of women into the workforce in the second half of 
the twentieth century39 marked one of the biggest societal and economic shifts 
in American history. 40   Despite this breakthrough, women entering the 
workforce in the 1960s and 1970s faced severe discrimination41 and sexual 
harassment.42  As the degree and prevalence of sexual harassment came to 
light, women’s groups began to publicize the problem and search for legal 
remedies under Title VII.43  The groups argued that sexual harassment was 
covered under Title VII when an employee’s job status was tied to unwanted 
sexual advances by a supervisor (quid pro quo harassment) because this 
behavior creates an employment barrier that would not be otherwise present 
                                                 
 39. In 1950, approximately thirty-three percent of women participated in the labor force; by 
1980 that number skyrocketed to over fifty percent.  Howard N. Fullerton Jr., Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Labor Force Participation: 75 Years of Change, 1950–98 and 1998–2025, MONTHLY 
LABOR REV., Dec. 1999, at 3–5, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1999/12/art1full.pdf. 
 40. Harold V. Hayghe, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Developments in Women’s Labor Force 
Participation, Monthly Labor Rev., Sept. 1997, at 41, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1997/09/art6full.pdf; see also Diane L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling 
and Sexual Stereotyping: Historical and Legal Perspectives of Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 581, 591–92 (1997) (attributing the rise of women in the workplace to cultural 
and historical factors, including increased educational opportunities, more progressive views of 
gender roles, the rising cost of living, and antidiscrimination laws). 
 41. Bridge, supra note 40, at 591–93.  Although there was a significant increase in the 
presence of women in the workforce, women still faced discrimination in hiring, salary, and 
promotions.  Id. at 592.  A 1963 report by the Presidential Commission on the Status of Women, 
commissioned by President Kennedy and chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, also uncovered 
widespread gender discrimination against women in hiring and pay.  BAKER, supra note 1, at 13.  
The report prompted President Kennedy to issue an executive order that prohibited sexual 
discrimination in the hiring of federal workers.  Id. 
 42. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF 
SEX DISCRIMINATION 26–27 (1979).  Redbook Magazine’s 1976 poll surveying 9,000 women 
reported that nine out of ten women experienced sexual harassment at work.  Id. at 26–27.  
Similarly, a 1981 study of federal workers found that forty-two percent of females had been 
victims of sexual harassment.  Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace: Is It a Problem?, 
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD (1981), reprinted in LAURA W. STEIN, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENT HISTORY 19 2–21 (1999).  Scholars point to the 
treatment of female slaves as an example of early sexual harassment before the term was coined 
in the 1970s.  See e.g., Reva B. Siegel, A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 3–8 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva Siegel eds., 2004). 
 43. See Susan Brownmiller & Delores Alexander, How We Got Here: From Carmita Wood 
to Anita Hill (1992), reprinted in STEIN, supra note 42, at 1–2 (discussing the grassroots effort to 
publicize sexual harassment in the early 1970s); see also Enid Nemy, Women Begin to Speak Out 
Against Sexual Harassment at Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1975, at 38 (chronicling women’s 
groups’ attempts to raise awareness about sexual harassment and their search for legal remedies).  
Nemy’s article was among the first mainstream press given to the subject of sexual harassment 
and was widely syndicated in newspapers across the country.  BAKER, supra note 1, at 35–36. 
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but for the employee’s sex.44  Initially, courts dismissed the argument that 
sexual harassment rose to the level of discrimination,45 reading Title VII as 
prohibiting only employment discrimination based on sex stereotypes in hiring 
or firing practices.46  
Notwithstanding early setbacks, the law evolved over time.  First, Congress 
passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which amended Title 
VII to strengthen the enforcement power of the EEOC, 47  and reaffirmed 
Congress’s intent to end sex discrimination in employment.48  Second, in 1976, 
the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia issued a landmark ruling 
in Williams v. Saxbe that recognized quid pro quo sexual harassment as 
discrimination under Title VII.49  The Williams court broadly read Title VII’s 
intent as prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination, including sexual 
harassment. 50   Additionally, the court in Williams found the employer 
vicariously liable for the supervisor’s decision to tie employment status to the 
employee’s reaction to his sexual advances.51 The D.C. Court’s ruling gave 
                                                 
 44. See SAGUY, supra note 1, at 29–30 (discussing the strategy of framing sexual 
harassment as a Title VII issue). 
 45. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 235–36 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (finding no 
liability for the employer in a quid pro quo claim by a female employee who was fired for 
refusing to have sex with a supervisor because the employee failed to report the conduct), rev’d, 
600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 
1975) (finding that plaintiff’s complaint alleging verbal and sexual advances did not qualify as an 
“unlawful employment practice” that fell within the scope of Title VII), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th 
Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Train, No. 1828-73, 13 FEP Cases 123, 1974 WL 10628 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 
1974) (characterizing sexual harassment as an interpersonal problem between employees rather 
than workplace sex discrimination), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). 
 46. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc. 444 F.2d 1194, 1197–98 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding 
that firing a female employee based on marital status violated Title VII).  The Sprogis court 
explained that a prohibition on employment practices based on gender stereotypes fell within 
Title VII’s goal of eliminating workplace sex discrimination.  Id. at 1198. 
 47. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972); 
see H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 8–17 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2143–53 
[hereinafter H.R. REP. NO 92-238] (discussing enhanced enforcement for the EEOC); see also 
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77–78 (explaining that Congress’s hope that employers 
would voluntarily comply with Title VII was overly optimistic and thereby led Congress to 
strengthen the EEOC’s investigatory and enforcement powers in 1972). 
 48. H.R. REP. NO 92-238, supra note 47, at 65.  Congress noted that sex discrimination 
continued to be widespread and as significant as other forms of employment discrimination. Id. 
 49. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp 654, 654–57 (D.D.C. 1976). 
 50. Id. at 657 (noting that “sex discrimination” as used in the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act encompassed a wide range of discriminatory practices).  The Williams court 
rejected the argument that a sexually harassed employee was discriminated against because she 
refused sex, rather than because of her gender, stating that the argument ignored the fact that the 
harassment created a barrier to employment that is only present but for the employee’s gender.  
Id. at 657–58. 
 51. Id. at 660–61 (explaining that Title VII was violated when the supervisor sexually 
harassed the plaintiff, and that the supervisor’s actions were imputed to the employer). The court 
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courts across the country the much-needed impetus to begin to recognize quid 
pro quo harassment claims under Title VII.52  
The 1970s and early 1980s also saw the development of hostile  
work-environment discrimination claims.  In 1971, the Fifth Circuit held in 
Rogers v. EEOC that Title VII prohibited employment practices or supervisor 
conduct that did not tangibly alter the employment status of an employee but 
created a racially hostile work environment.53  Ten years later, in Bundy v. 
Jackson, the D.C. Circuit applied the same reasoning in the gender context 
when it held that sexual harassment could create an actionable hostile work 
environment.54  
C.  The 1980 EEOC Guidance 
Despite these positive developments, sexual harassment litigation remained 
unsettled.55  As a result, in 1980, the EEOC issued guidelines56 that defined 
sexual harassment generally,57 recognizing both quid pro quo harassment58  
 
                                                                                                                 
went on to quell concerns that this finding would expose employers to too much liability.  Id.  
The court explained that Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment conditions from being 
imposed on an employee based on sex, and that holding employers vicariously liable for a 
supervisor’s actions falls within the statute.  Id. 
 52. See Tompkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048–49 (3d Cir. 1977); 
Barnes v. Train, No. 1828-73, 13 FEP Cases 123, 1974 WL 10628 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1974), rev’d 
sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. 
Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55, 55 (9th Cir. 1977); see also BAKER, supra 
note 1, at 22–25 (discussing the significance of the Williams decision); GWENDOLYN MINK, 
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: THE POLITICAL BETRAYAL OF SEXUALLY HARASSED WOMEN 48–51 
(2000) (discussing the impact of the Williams decision and the subsequent history of Barnes, 
Tompkins, and Corne). 
 53. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (defining a hostile work 
environment as one “so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the 
emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers”). 
 54. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.3d 935, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  The Bundy court noted that if 
employers were not liable for a hostile work environment created by sexual harassment, “an 
employer could sexually harass a female employee with impunity by carefully stopping short of 
firing the employee or taking any other tangible actions against her.”  Id. 
 55. See David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual 
Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1721 (2002) (noting that quid pro quo and hostile 
work-environment cases did not address “garden variety sexual harassment” wherein humiliation 
or other non-sexual motivations arose). 
 56. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980); see also Schwartz, supra note 55, at 1721. 
 57. § 1604.11(a) (defining sexual harassment as “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests 
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature”). 
 58. The Commission stated quid pro quo harassment occurred when “(1) submission to such 
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s  
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis 
for employment decisions affecting such individual.”  Id. 
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and hostile work-environment harassment59 as actionable under Title VII.60  
The guidelines also imposed liability on employers if the employer or the 
employer’s agents knew or should have known about the harassment, unless 
the employer or agent took adequate corrective actions. 61  Additionally, the 
EEOC reaffirmed Title VII’s prevention goal by urging employers to use 
preventative steps to curb sexual harassment.62  
D.  Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson: Supreme Court Recognition of 
Sexual Harassment as Discrimination 
Ten years after the Williams court recognized sexual harassment as a form of 
employment discrimination, the Supreme Court finally addressed Title VII 
sexual harassment claims in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.63  Justice 
William Rehnquist, writing for the Court, began his analysis by recognizing 
that sexual harassment constituted a form of sex discrimination, and that Title 
VII’s prohibition against gender discrimination was not limited to harassment 
that resulted in “economic” or “tangible” discrimination.64   Echoing the EEOC 
guidelines,65 the Court recognized two basic types of sexual harassment as 
actionable under Title VII: (1) quid pro quo, where harassment results in a 
tangible employment action; and (2) hostile work environment, where an 
employee’s status is unaffected but the sexual harassment is “sufficiently 
severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and 
create an abusive working environment.’”66  
Despite establishing a Title VII claim for sexual harassment, the Court did 
not define the scope of employer liability.67  The Court rejected the view that 
                                                 
 59. The Commission defined hostile work-environment sexual harassment as involving 
“such conduct [that] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s 
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”  Id. 
 60. § 1604.11(c). 
 61. § 1604.11(d). 
 62. § 1604.11(e) (providing that an employer must affirmatively prevent sexual harassment 
from occurring by raising the subject of harassment, expressing disapproval of harassing conduct, 
and imposing sanctions). 
 63. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59 (1986). 
 64. Id. at 64.  Justice William Rehnquist interpreted the phrase “terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment” in Title VII to mean that Congress intended to broadly “‘strike at the 
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in employment.”  Id. (quoting L.A. 
Dep’t. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978), vacated, 461 U.S. 951 
(1983)). 
 65. Id. at 65 (explaining that while the EEOC guidelines are not controlling, litigants and 
courts can refer to them for guidance).  The EEOC also filed an amicus brief on behalf of Vinson, 
arguing that a hostile work-environment claim can prevail even when no adverse employment 
action took place.  Id. at 70–71. 
 66. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 867, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
 67. Id. at 70, 72 (declining to create a definitive rule on employer liability but noting that it 
agreed with “the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in 
this area”). 
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an employer should be “automatically liable” for sexual harassment by 
supervisors, but also declared that the mere existence of a complaint procedure 
did not shield an employer from all liability.68  Thus, the Court remanded the 
case to determine if the supervisor’s conduct was “severe or pervasive” enough 
to constitute an actionable Title VII claim.69  The lack of direction by the 
Supreme Court on the issue of employer liability resulted in continued 
struggles by the lower courts to determine liability in hostile work-
environment claims.70  
E.  Ellerth and Faragher: The Court Clarifies Liability  
Sexual harassment claims greatly increased following Meritor 71  and 
Congress’s passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.72  After a number of 
highly publicized scandals, sexual harassment became a hotly debated issue, 
and the Supreme Court was urged to address the matter.73  
Finally, in 1998, the Supreme Court announced Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth 74  and Faragaher v. City of Boca Raton, 75  providing much-needed 
                                                 
 68. Id. at 72–73.  Justice Rehnquist explained that under agency principles courts have 
correctly held employers strictly liable for tangible employment actions.  Id. at 70–72 (explaining 
that lower courts consistently held employers liable for quid pro quo harassment). 
 69. Id. at 72–73. 
 70. For a discussion of the impact of the Meritor decision, see Elsenheimer, supra note 6, at 
1641–42.  See also B. Glenn George, If You’re Not Part of the Solution, You’re Part of the 
Problem: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 137 (2001) 
(noting the courts’ struggle with employer liability until 1998); John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, 
and the Disappearance of “Vicarious” Liability: The Emergence of a Dubious Summary-
Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile Environment 
Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1401, 1414 nn. 69–71 (2002) (listing cases that hold 
employers vicariously liable, and cases that apply a “knew-or-should-have-known standard.”). 
 71. From 1980 to 1985, the EEOC received only sixteen Title VII complaints, but following 
the Meritor decision, 624 charges were filed in 1986 and 1658 charges were filed in 1987.  
Kristin H. Berger Parker, Ambient Harassment Under Title VII: Reconsidering the Workplace 
Environment, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 945, 953 (2008). 
 72. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 105-1071 (1991) (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added provisions expanding the 
rights of women to sue and collect compensatory and punitive damages for sexual discrimination 
or harassment, which led to more litigation surrounding sexual harassment, and heightened the 
need for more clearly defined liability standards.  See Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife 
Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 320–21 (2004). 
 73. See MINK, supra note 52, at 97–102 (discussing high profile sexual harassment cases 
including the Clarence Thomas Supreme Court nomination hearing, which focused on his alleged 
sexual harassment of Anita Hill while Thomas was Commissioner of the EEOC).  Senator 
Edward Kennedy, a chief opponent of Thomas’s Supreme Court nomination, commented that due 
to Anita Hill’s testimony, the general public had a greater understanding of the severity of sexual 
harassment.  STEIN, supra note 42 at 116–19; see also, Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual 
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1692–96 (1998) (chronicling the litany of sexual harassment 
news stories in the 1990s). 
 74. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 75. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
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direction on the question of employer liability in hostile work-environment 
claims.76  These rulings are the “guideposts” for employer liability in hostile 
work-environment claims.77  
1.  Burlington Industries v. Ellerth 
In Ellerth, Kimberly Ellerth alleged that her supervisor groped her and made 
inappropriate sexual remarks over the course of several months; however, 
Ellerth suffered no tangible employment actions nor did she report her 
supervisor’s conduct.78  Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
clarified that the terms “quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment” do not 
control in determining liability.79   Instead, the Court, reaffirming Meritor, 
stressed that tangible employment actions are important in finding liability.80  
However, the Court also held that when the harassing behavior does not result 
in a tangible employment action, a claim becomes actionable when the conduct 
is “severe or pervasive.”81   
On the issue of liability, the Court relied on agency principles.82  Under 
agency principles, an employer is not liable for torts committed by a supervisor 
acting outside the scope of employment unless the employer was “negligent or 
reckless” or the supervisor was “aided in the commission of the tort by the 
existence of the agency relation.” 83  The Court did not find Ellerth’s employer 
                                                 
 76. In the 1993 case, Harris v. Forklift Systems, the Court provided further guidance on 
what constitutes an actionable hostile work-environment claim by holding that a hostile  
work-environment claim will be based on a totality of circumstances test.  Harris, 510 U.S. 17, 23 
(1993) (listing the following factors as helpful for determining if harassment creates a hostile 
work environment: “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes 
with an employee’s work performance”). 
 77. Elsenheimer, supra note 6, at 1645. 
 78. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747–49.  The Seventh Circuit overturned the district court’s 
dismissal of Kimberly Ellerth’s claims in eight separate opinions with no consensus regarding 
employer liability claims.  Id. at 749. 
 79. Id. at 751.  The Court noted that the terms “quid pro quo” and “hostile work 
environment” were not included in Title VII, nor were they used to establish liability in Meritor.  
Id. at 752 (noting that the terms serve specific and limited purposes in Meritor).  The Court noted, 
however, that lower courts used the terms as a benchmark for determining whether an employer 
was automatically, vicariously liable, or if the employee had to prove that the harassment was 
“severe or pervasive.”  Id. at 754–55; see also Nancy R. Mansfield & Joan T. A. Gabel, An 
Analysis of the Burlington and Faragher Affirmative Defense: When Are Employers Liable?, 19 
LAB. LAW. 107, 110 (2003) (detailing the affirmative defense standard in Ellerth and Faragher). 
 80. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762–63 (explaining that under Title VII, liability for quid pro quo 
harassment imputes the employer because the company empowered the supervisor to make 
tangible employment decisions about the victim-employee). 
 81. Id. at 752. 
 82. Id. at 758–61 (stating that under agency principles, liability for torts committed outside 
the scope of employment will still be imputed to the employer under certain situations). 
 83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1996); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 
758–59 (discussing section 219(2) of the Restatement).  Since it was cited by the Ellerth court, 
2012] Need to Apply the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense 1143 
liable because although “[n]egligence sets a minimum standard for employer 
liability under Title VII,” Ellerth did not report the harassment to her 
employer.84  Despite her lack of reporting, Ellerth asserted that her employer 
should be liable because the agency relation between the employee and the 
supervisor enabled the supervisor’s harassment.85  Essentially, Ellerth raised a 
“more stringent standard of vicarious liability.”86  
 Justice Kennedy, noting the tension between agency law and the Meritor 
rule,87  focused the Court’s analysis on Congress’s intent in enacting Title 
VII.88  The Court found that Title VII was intended to eliminate harassment in 
the workplace, a policy best supported by encouraging employers to implement 
antiharassment and notification policies.89  Based on that rationale, the Court 
established that an employer can still be liable even when no tangible 
employment action is taken, unless it successfully raises an affirmative defense 
to the claim.90  The defense consisted of two elements: “(a) that the employer 
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually 
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to 
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”91  Furthermore, the Court held that 
when a tangible employment action is taken against an employee, an employee 
is strictly liable.92 
Ultimately, the Court remanded the case, stating that Ellerth should be 
allowed to show that the harassment was “pervasive or severe” and that the 
employer should be able to assert the affirmative defense.93  Justice Thomas 
                                                                                                                 
the Second Restatement has published a new edition; however, section 219 remains substantively 
unchanged.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.04, 7.07, 7.08 (2005). 
 84. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748–49, 759 (finding negligence when the employer knew or should 
have known of the conduct). 
 85. See id. at 759. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 763.  Justice Kennedy acknowledged the logic in holding employers strictly liable 
under agency law because a supervisor’s superior position and ability to affect the employee’s job 
status was always at least an implicit factor in the sexual harassment.  Id.  On the other hand, 
Justice Kennedy noted that in some harassing situations the agency relation has no bearing on the 
supervisor’s conduct.  Id. 
 88. Id. at 763–64. 
 89. Id. (noting that Title VII was intended to encourage companies to create antiharassment 
policies and more effective grievance mechanisms).  The Court explained that attaching liability 
to an employer’s effort to create antiharassment procedures would support “Congress’ intention 
to promote reconciliation rather than litigation,” and limiting liability where an employee does 
not report the harassment “could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it 
becomes severe or pervasive. . .  [and] serve Title VII’s deterrent purpose.”  Id. at 764. 
 90. Id. at 764–65. 
 91. Id. at 765. 
 92. Id. (explaining that the defense is not available if harassment results in a tangible 
employment action). 
 93. Id. at 766. 
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dissented, arguing that employers should only be liable if they negligently 
allow harassment to occur.94  
2.  Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Court applied the affirmative defense 
set forth in Ellerth and further expounded on its underlying principles. 95  
Similar to Ellerth, the facts of Faragher involved a hostile work-environment 
claim that did not result in a tangible employment action.96  Justice David 
Souter, writing for the majority, elaborated on the agency principles 
underpinning vicarious liability for sexual harassment by a supervisor.97   
Recognizing that the Meritor holding did not make an employer 
“automatically” liable under Title VII, the Court explained that the affirmative 
defense outlined in Ellerth best wedded the agency principles of vicarious 
liability and Meritor’s prohibition on strict liability under Title VII.98  The 
Court also asserted that Ellerth’s affirmative defense addressed Congress’s 
goal of making victims whole, encouraging employers to implement 
antiharassment procedures, and supporting employees to utilize these 
procedures to mitigate harm.99  Applying the affirmative defense, the Court 
found that the City of Boca Raton had not taken reasonable steps to prevent 
harassment.100  
                                                 
 94. Id. at 767 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas also warned that the new standard 
delineated in Ellerth would lead to more litigation and perpetuate the uncertainty surrounding 
employer liability.  Id. at 774 (characterizing the affirmative defense outlined in Ellerth as 
“vague”). 
 95. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
 96. Id. at 780–83.  Beth Ann Faragher, a part-time lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton, 
Florida, alleged that two supervisors repeatedly sexually harassed her, both verbally and 
physically.  Id.  The City adopted an antiharassment policy, but failed to circulate the policy to 
Faragher’s supervisors and co-workers.  Id. at 781–82. 
 97. Id. at 793.  The Eleventh Circuit rejected vicarious liability in Faragher’s claim, holding: 
(1) the supervisors were not acting within the scope of their employment; (2) their harassment 
was not “aided by the agency relationship;” and (3) the employer was not negligent in failing to 
prevent the harassment.  Id.  Justice David Souter explained that although sexual harassment did 
not literally fall within the scope of employment, courts have expanded the definition to include 
actions that are foreseeable consequences of the workplace such as sexual harassment.  Id. at 
794–96.  Justice Souter next concluded that supervisors are “aided by the agency relationship” 
when sexually harassing a subordinate employee because of the employee’s inability to ignore or 
avoid a supervisor in the workplace and their likely reluctance to risk “blowing the whistle.”  Id. 
at 802–03. 
 98. Id. at 804–05. 
 99. Id. at 806–07 (stating that the Ellerth affirmative defense gives deference to responsible 
employers while encouraging victims to mitigate harm through reasonable means). 
 100. Id. at 808–10 (finding that the City failed to notify its employees of its sexual 
harassment policies). 
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F.  The Fifth and Eighth Circuits Do Not Follow the Ellerth/Faragher Test in 
Incipient or Single Incident Sexual Hostile Work-Environment Sexual 
Harassment Cases 
Following the Supreme Court decisions in Ellerth and Faragher, the EEOC 
issued policy guidance clarifying the application of the new framework and 
voicing their support for the use of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.101  
In 2004, the Court reaffirmed the use of the Ellerth/Faragher defense in 
Pennsylvania State Police v. Sunders.102  
1. Incipient Harassment 
Despite this new rule, in 1999, the Fifth Circuit declined to apply the 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc.103  
The case arose after Constance Indest filed a Title VII lawsuit against her 
employer, Freeman Decorating, alleging that a company vice president 
sexually harassed her during a week-long design convention. 104   Indest 
reported the harassment to her branch manager, and the company reprimanded 
the vice president.105 Indest’s employment status was not altered following the 
incident.106   
The district court dismissed the case before the Supreme Court announced 
Ellerth and Faragher.107  When the case reached the Fifth Circuit, however, a 
three-judge panel heard the case in light of the new standard articulated in 
Ellerth and Faragher. 108   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal in a per curium decision, but there was no majority to provide a clear 
rationale for the holding.109   
The first opinion, issued by Judge Edith Jones, recognized that the case 
should be examined in light of the Ellerth and Faragher decisions. 110  
Nonetheless, Judge Jones did not apply the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative 
                                                 
 101. Equal Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for 
Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance] available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html. 
 102. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 133–34 (2004) (reiterating a summation of the 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense). 
 103. Indest I, 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the case on the immediate 
response of the employer). 
 104. Id. at 260. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 260–61 (noting that Constance Indest received periodic raises after the incident).  
After the company reprimanded the vice president, Indest notified the human resources director 
that she intended to file a complaint with the EEOC, fearing retaliation from the vice president.  
Id.  The director assured Indest that no retaliation would occur and that the company would 
suspend the vice president for one week.  Id. at 261 
 107. Id. at 258, 260. 
 108. Id. at 263. 
 109. See Indest II, 168 F.3d 795, 796 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999) (Weiner, J., specially concurring). 
 110. Indest I, 164 F.3d at 260. 
1146 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:1131 
defense111 and found that Freeman Decorating should not be liable because the 
company promptly and properly responded to the harassment claim.112  Judge 
Jones noted that holding Freeman Decorating liable for the sexual harassment 
of Indest could be equated to strict liability, an outcome that runs counter to the 
rule expressed in Meritor and was subsequently affirmed in Ellerth and 
Faragher that Title VII does not impose absolute liability on employers.113  In 
reaching this conclusion, Judge Jones distinguished the company’s quick 
response to Indest’s claim from Ellerth and Faragher, cases involving repeated 
harassment where the victims were unaware of or never utilized the 
companies’ antiharassment policies.114  Thus, the court held that Ellerth and 
Faragher did not control in “incipient” or early-stage hostile work-
environment claims.115   
Judge Jacques Weiner concurred with the judgment, but rejected Judge 
Jones’s abandonment of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in incipient 
hostile work environments.116  Judge Weiner noted that the Supreme Court did 
not expressly limit Ellerth and Faragher to exclude incipient claims.117  Judge 
Weiner also rejected the argument that applying Ellerth and Faragher in 
incipient sexual harassment claims would create a strict liability standard, 
stressing that claims are actionable only if they are “severe or pervasive.”118  
Judge Weiner found that the case should be dismissed because the harassment 
did not breach the “severe or pervasive” threshold.119   
Since neither Judge Jones nor Judge Weiner reached a quorum, their 
opinions are not precedential.120  However, Judge Jones’s opinion has been 
cited in subsequent cases holding that there is no vicarious liability when an 
employer takes prompt actions to remediate sexual harassment.121 
                                                 
 111. Under the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, Freeman Decorating would be liable 
even though it responded promptly because Indest reported the harassment to the company.  See 
supra note 84. 
 112. Indest I, 164 F.3d at 264. 
 113. Id. at 266. 
 114. Id. at 265. 
 115. Id. at 265–66 (explaining that holding an employer liable when it “nipped the hostile 
environment in the bud” would undermine Title VII’s deterrent policy). 
 116. Indest II, 168 F.3d 795, 796 (5th Cir. 1999) (Weiner, J., specially concurring). 
 117. Id. at 798 (stating that the Court designed the Ellerth/Faragher defense to apply to all 
hostile work-environment claims).  Quoting the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, Judge 
Weiner concluded that the Court designed the defense “as the only hatch through which an 
employer might escape vicarious liability when ‘harassment by a supervisor . . . creates the 
requisite degree of discrimination.”  Id.  at 801 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
775, 804 (1998)). 
 118. Id. at 803–04. 
 119. Id. at 806. 
 120. Id. at 796 n.1; see also Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1910) (stating that a 
case reached absent a quorum has no precedential weight). 
 121. See Kreamer v. Henry’s Towing, 150 F. App’x 378, 382–83 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Indest I and holding that because the defendant employer “took prompt remedial action as a 
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2.  Single-Incident Harassment 
In McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, a case involving a single incident of 
sexual harassment, the Eighth Circuit also declined to apply the 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.122   Jamie McCurdy, a radio dispatcher 
for the Arkansas State Police (ASP), sued the ASP after a police officer 
fondled and verbally harassed her during an evening shift. 123   McCurdy 
reported the incident, and the officer was demoted and transferred as the result 
of the ensuing investigation.124  The Eighth Circuit cited Judge Jones’s opinion 
in Indest, and distinguished this single incident of sexual harassment and the 
ASP’s remedial actions from Ellerth and Faragher.125  The court determined 
that under the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, the ASP would be liable 
despite its prompt response because McCurdy reported the incident.126  Like 
Judge Jones, the Eighth Circuit rejected this outcome as creating strict liability 
for employers in single-incident cases,127  stating, “[s]trict adherence to the 
Supreme Court’s two-prong affirmative defense in this case is like trying to fit 
a square peg in a round hole.” 128   Thus, the court held that the 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense did not apply to single-incident 
harassment cases, and that employers were vicariously liable only under a 
negligence theory.129  Because the ASP took “swift and effective action,” it 
was not negligent.130 
G. The Tenth Circuit and United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Indiana Apply the Full Ellerth/Faragher Defense in Incipient and  
Single-Incident Cases 
In 2001, in Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., the Tenth Circuit diverged from 
the Fifth Circuit and applied the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to an 
                                                                                                                 
matter of law” the employer is not liable).  In later opinions, Judge Weiner has reiterated that 
neither of the Indest opinions are precedential, but has applied the Ellerth and Faragher defense 
in full by distinguishing the cases from the facts of Indest.  See, e.g., Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 
F.3d 278, 283 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Marks, supra note 70, at 1423–24. 
 122. 375 F.3d 762, 774 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 123. Id. at 764. 
 124. Id. at 765, 767. 
 125. Id. at 773–74 (citing Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
 126. Id. at 774. 
 127. Id.; see supra notes 110–15 and accompanying text (outlining Judge Jones’s arguments 
for limiting the defense). 
 128. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 771. 
 129. See id. at 771, 773. 
 130. Id. at 773–74 (“We conclude by applauding the ASP for its swift and effective response 
to McCurdy’s report of the single instance of sexual harassment.  Title VII forbids sexual 
harassment in the workplace, and the ASP followed this prohibition . . . .”).  In a dissenting 
opinion, Judge Michael Melloy rejected this limitation of Ellerth and Faragher as unsupported by 
the text of those opinions and noted that the EEOC supported application of both prongs of the 
affirmative defense in all situations.  Id. at 775–76 (Melloy, J., dissenting). 
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incipient-harassment claim.131  Jeanne Harrison, a mineworker, filed a Title 
VII sexual harassment claim after enduring two months of severe sexual 
harassment and assault by her supervisor. 132   The case reached the Tenth 
Circuit after the district court ruled in favor of Harrison by applying the 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.133  On appeal, the employer asserted that 
it should not have been required to meet the second element of the 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, an argument consistent with Judge 
Jones’s opinion in Indest.134  The Tenth Circuit refuted this argument, finding 
that the district court correctly applied the full Ellerth/Faragher affirmative 
defense.135  The Tenth Circuit rejected the employer’s position for a number of 
reasons.  First, it noted that the lack of a majority opinion in Indest stripped 
either opinion of any precedential authority.136  Rather, the Harrison court 
relied on Tenth Circuit precedent that upheld the use of the Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense, even when an employer took prompt action to remedy the 
harassment.137  Additionally, the court also noted significant factual differences 
between the conduct in Indest and the severe conduct Harrison alleged.138 
More recently, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Indiana applied the full Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in a  
single-incident case in Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp.139  Annastacia Alalade 
filed a sexual harassment claim against her employer AWS alleging that her 
supervisor sexually assaulted her. 140   Alalade promptly complained to her 
                                                 
 131. 248 F.3d 1014, 1024–26 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 132. Id. at 1016–18 (describing a number of occasions when Harrison’s supervisor forced her 
to perform sexual acts in isolated areas of the mine). 
 133. Id. at 1020–23.  The court found for Harrison on the grounds that the employer could 
not meet both elements of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, because although the 
employer acted promptly upon notification of the conduct, Harrison did not unreasonably delay 
filing the complaint against her supervisor.  Id. at 1024. 
 134. Id. (rejecting the company’s argument that Indest correctly limited the Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense). 
 135. Id. at 1026. 
 136. Id. at 1025.  The Tenth Circuit explained, “As outlined in Indest II, there is no reason to 
believe that the ‘remarkably straightforward’ framework outlined in Faragher and Burlington 
does not control all cases in which a plaintiff employee seeks to hold his or her employer 
vicariously liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment.” Id. at 1026 (quoting Indest II, 168 F.3d 
795, 796 (5th Cir. 1999) (Weiner, J., specially concurring)). 
 137. Id. at 1025–26 (citing Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th 
Cir. 1998)).  In Gunnell, the Tenth Circuit held that the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense 
applied even where the employer ultimately stopped further harassment.  Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 
1261. 
 138. Harrison, 248 F.3d at 1026 (distinguishing the Indest facts from the more severe 
misconduct in the present case). 
 139. 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 944 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 140. Id. at 937.  A full description of the events can be found in the district court’s denial of 
summary judgment for AWS.  Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., No. 3:09-CV-338-PPS, 2011 
WL 1884339, *1-3 (N.D. Ind. May 18, 2011). 
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employer, and her supervisor was terminated.141   The district court denied 
AWS’s summary judgment motion, and AWS filed a motion to reconsider on 
the grounds that it should not have had to satisfy the second element of the 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense because it had promptly responded to 
Alalade’s complaint.142   
The court first explained that although Ellerth and Faragher involved 
prolonged harassment, Ellerth and Faragher did not suggest that the rulings 
were not intended to include single-incident harassment cases.143  The court 
conceded that the modification for single-incident sexual harassment claims 
asserted by AWS and used in McCurdy would incentivize employers to take 
preventative steps to end sexual harassment.144  The court contended, however, 
that disregarding the second element of the test would ignore the goal of 
encouraging employees to mitigate harm by reporting harassment.145  Thus, the 
court denied AWS’s motion to reconsider.146  
II.  REVIEWING THE REASONING IN THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: STARE DECISIS AND 
STRICT LIABILITY CONCERNS 
A.  Stare Decisis:  The Sixth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit Narrow the Ellerth 
and Faragher Holdings, While the Tenth Circuit and the Alalade Court Follow 
Precedent 
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits in Indest and McCurdy interpreted Ellerth and 
Faragher to apply only to cases involving sexual harassment that occurred 
over a period of time.147  In incipient and single-instance harassment cases, the 
Fifth and Eighth Circuits limit the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to its 
first element, imputing liability only if the employer failed to take steps to 
prevent sexual harassment or did not properly respond to complaints.148  This 
approach essentially imposes the “negligence” standard  Justice Thomas urged 
in his dissenting opinion in Ellerth.149  The negligence standard, however, 
                                                 
 141. Alalade, 2011 WL 1884339, at *1. 
 142. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 937–38. 
 143. Id. at 940.  AWS argued that employers with antiharassment policies and who promptly 
respond to complaints should only have to satisfy the first element of the defense to avoid liablity.  
Id. at 944.  The court rejected this argument: “[t]he Supreme Court did not see fit to carve off 
single-instance harassment cases for special treatment under Ellerth and Faragher. So even if I 
was convinced Ellerth/Faragher’s second prong should not apply to single-instance harassment 
cases, that would not permit me to modify the defense here.”  Id. at 946. 
 144. Id. at 945. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 945–56. 
 147. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 771 (8th Cir. 2004); Indest I, 164 F.3d 258, 
265 (5th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the Ellerth and Faragher facts from situations where the 
employer takes prompt remedial action upon receiving a complaint). 
 148. See McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 773–74; Indest I, 164 F.3d at 266–67. 
 149. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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ignores the Court’s holding that negligence merely sets the floor for employer 
liability, and that even non-negligent employers can be liable for hostile  
work-environment claims.150 
Indeed, in Ellerth and Faragher, the Supreme Court did not include any 
language limiting the application of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense 
to strictly analogous patterns of discrimination.151  In fact, Meritor, Ellerth, and 
Faragher—the Court’s seminal opinions on employer liability for sexual 
harassment—all noted that the existence of an antiharassment policy should 
not wholly shield an employer from liability.152 
In Ellerth and Faragher, the Court discussed other limits on the application 
of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.  For instance, the defense only 
applies to alleged harassment by a “supervisor,”153 and states that an employer 
should be liable only for coworker-on-coworker sexual harassment under the 
negligence standard.154  Thus, it seems probable that, if the Court wished to 
limit the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to longer patterns of 
harassment, it would have said as much.  Judge Weiner’s concurrence in 
Indest, the Tenth Circuit in Harrison, and the district court in Alalade all 
explained that, absent specific limitations from the Court, the full 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense should be followed.155  
                                                 
 150. See McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 759. 
 151. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (citing Ellerth’s holding 
that employers are vicariously liable for an actionable hostile work environment created by a 
supervisor). 
 152. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998) (stating that the Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense can be satisfied or refined in multiple ways and is not limited to a finding of 
employer grievance procedures); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792 (noting that Meritor held that neither 
the mere existence of a grievance procedure nor the lack of notice of harassment was enough to 
automatically shield an employer from liability); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 
72–73 (1986) (“[W]e reject the petitioner’s view that the mere existence of a grievance procedure 
or policy against discrimination, coupled with the respondent’s failure to invoke that procedure 
must insulate petitioner from liability.”). 
 153. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762–63. Interestingly, the McCurdy 
court noted that even under the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, the ASP might not be liable 
because no agency relationship existed, as the offending police officer was not McCurdy’s 
supervisor.  McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 773. 
 154. See e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760, 762 (explaining that the “aided by agency” 
requirement for imputing liability on employers does not encompass coworker harassment, even 
though the agency relationship afforded the coworker-harasser proximity to the victim). 
 155. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1104, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding no support 
for the claim that the Court intended to limit the application  of the Ellerth/Faragher defense) 
(citing Indest II, 168 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1999) (Weiner, J., specially concurring)); Indest II,  
168 F.3d at 796 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that Ellerth and Faragher apply to all hostile  
work-environment claims); Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940 (N.D. 
Ind. 2011). 
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B.  Strict Liability: The Fifth and Eighth Circuits Equate the Application of 
Ellerth/Faragher as Imposing Strict Liability on Employers 
Central to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Meritor, Ellerth, and Faragher 
is the notion that Title VII does not hold employers strictly liable for all 
supervisor-sexual harassment in the workplace. 156   The Fifth and Tenth 
Circuits justify their departures from the Ellerth/Faragher defense by claiming 
that the defense’s application to incipient or single-instance sexual harassment 
cases imposes liability on the employer regardless of any preventative 
measures in place.157  
Judge Weiner’s concurrence in Indest and the district court’s opinion in 
Alalade took a more holistic view of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense 
and did not find that it imposed strict liability.158  These decisions noted that 
the threshold question before the application of the Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense is even reached is whether the sexual harassment was so 
“severe” or “pervasive” that it creates a hostile work environment. 159  
Therefore, this high threshold results in a built-in defense to imposing strict 
liability on employers. 160   If employers promptly respond to harassment 
claims, rarely will sexual harassment create a work environment “so polluted 
with discrimination” that it becomes actionable under Title VII.161  Indeed, 
Judge Jones in Indest noted that because the employer promptly handled the 
                                                 
 156. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 524; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71. 
 157. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 772 (stating that imposing liability after an employer’s quick and 
appropriate response is in contrast to Meritor’s holding and creates strict liability); Indest I, 164 
F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1999) (claiming that vicarious liability would amount to strict liability and 
undermine Meritor where an employer is held vicariously liable even though it responded quickly 
and appropriately to the sexual harassment claim). 
 158. Indest II, 168 F.3d at 803 (Weiner, J., specially concurring) (stating the fear of strict 
liability is “as unwarranted as it is inaccurate”); Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 945 (disputing the 
argument that applying the full defense conflicts with Meritor’s rejection of strict liability). For a 
detailed discussion of why the Ellerth/Faragher standard does not impose strict liability, see 
Heather S. Murr, The Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers Strictly Liable for 
Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on Reasonableness, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 529, 635 (2006) (arguing that the Ellerth/Faragher does not go far enough in 
holding employers strictly liable). 
 159. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788–89; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751. 
 160. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (noting that isolated incidents do not rise to the level of a 
hostile-work environment, ensuring that Title VII is not transformed into a “general civility 
code”); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (explaining that a hostile  
work-environment is determined by looking at a variety of factors including frequency and 
severity of the conduct, its physically threatening or humiliating nature, and the degree to which it 
interferes with the victim’s work.  The opinion distinguishes severe actionable conduct from 
“mere offensive utterance[s]”); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 
238 (5th Cir. 1972)) (stating that a sexual harassment claim is only actionable if it is “severe or 
pervasive” enough to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment) (internal citations omitted). 
 161. See Indest II, 168 F.3d at 804 (explaining that the threat of liability for sexual 
harassment motivates employers). 
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harassment, no hostile work environment ever existed. 162   Judge Weiner 
argued that the case should be dismissed on the same grounds.163  Additionally, 
the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense applies to “liability or damages,”164 
thereby allowing an employer to shield itself from damages that accrue after an 
employee should have reasonably reported the harassment.165  
It is true that if the full defense is required in incipient or single-incident 
contexts where the harassment is severe enough to be actionable, employers 
will still be liable, even if they respond promptly upon learning of the 
harassment.166  These situations do resemble the strict liability situations that 
Meritor, Ellerth, and Faragher prohibit.167  Yet, the EEOC points out that this 
result is consistent with other Title VII violations, and the employer can still 
limit damages by promptly thwarting the harassment.168   
Additionally, shielding the employer from liability in these situations will 
often leave the employee-victim without a means to recover damages for his or 
her injury outside of a tort action.169  Shielding employers also contradicts Title 
VII’s policy of allowing recovery from the “deep[er]-pocket[ed]” employer.170  
                                                 
 162. Indest I, 164 F.3d at 264 (finding that brief exposure to the harassment did not amount 
to an actionable hostile work environment in light of the high demanding structure). 
 163. Indest II, 168 F.3d at 803–04. 
 164. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 165. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806–07 (noting that a plaintiff should not recover if she 
occasionally failed to utilize existing preventative or remedial procedures). 
 166. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72–73. 
 167. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72;  
 168. Enforcement Guidance, supra note 101, at *7 (“While this result may seem harsh to a 
law-abiding employer, it is consistent with liability standards under the antidiscrimination statutes 
that generally make employers responsible for the discriminatory acts of their supervisor”).  The 
EEOC also noted that the employer would still be liable where harm occurred even though 
requisite action was taken by the employer.  Id. at *7.  While a negligence standard would 
absolve employer liability in that situation, the EEOC has held that the Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense does not.  Id.  In fact, the EEOC expressly rejected the holding in Indest I: 
The Commission agrees with Judge Wiener that Ellerth and Faragher do control the 
analysis in [incipient] cases, and that an employee’s prompt complaint to management 
forecloses the employer from proving the affirmative defense. However, as Judge 
Wiener pointed out, an employer’s quick remedial action will often thwart the creation 
of an unlawful hostile environment, rendering any consideration of employer liability 
unnecessary. 
Id. at *7 n.46. 
 169. See Joanna Stromberg, Sexual Harassment: Discrimination or Tort?, 12 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 317, 326–27 (2003).  Stromberg argues that Title VII suits, rather common law 
tort suits, provide the plaintiff with a better opportunity to recover from an employer for sexual 
harassment.  Id. at 326.  Stromberg notes that Title VII’s intent standard is lower and courts 
recognize that more acts qualify as harassment under Title VII than under traditional common 
law.  Id. at 327. 
 170. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 757.  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was 
passed, in part, to allow monetary recovery from employers for discrimination than in the hopes 
that risk of financial losses would cause employers to eradicate proactively discrimination from 
the workplace.  See Sandra Tafuri, Title VII’s Antiretaliation Provision: Are Employees Protected 
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Furthermore, the Court noted in Faragher that imposing liability, or the threat 
of liability, for the actions of supervisors encourages employers to screen, 
train, and monitor supervisors more closely.171  
Moreover, many scholars suggest that courts “are unduly impressed” by a 
company that has a sexual harassment policy in place, finding that the 
existence of a policy alone satisfies the first prong of the test.172  Thus, if the 
court were to modify the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to only the first 
element, an employer could entirely shield  itself from liability by having a 
policy in place, regardless of the effectiveness or level of implementation of 
the policy. 173   In the words of the Alalade court, this result “creates an 
exception that swallows the Ellerth/Faragher rule.”174  
Therefore, the full application of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense 
strikes the better balance.  Employers possess the ability to shield themselves 
from liability or damages by responding promptly to sexual harassment and 
preventing a hostile work environment from materializing, yet employees are 
not barred from recovery simply because an antiharassment policy exists.  
                                                                                                                 
After the Employment Relationship Has Ended?, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 797, 816–18 (1996) 
(discussing the changes made to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
 171. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (noting that because there are fewer supervisors than 
employees, employers have a greater ability to control and monitor supervisors’ actions, making 
the imposition of greater liability more fair); see also Tafuri, supra note 170, at 817 (noting that 
Title VII’s monetary damages gave incentive for enforcement of the statute). 
 172. David J. Walsh, Small Change: An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Supreme Court 
Precedents on Federal Appeals Court Decisions in Sexual Harassment Cases, 1993-2005, 30 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 461, 472–73 (2009); see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of 
Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence 
of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 1, 5 (2001) (noting “the willingness of some courts to defer to procedures that lack due process 
protections and the full panoply of remedies existing under Title VII raises grave concerns about 
the ability of grievance procedures to vindicate employee rights.”).  A study of employment 
sexual harassment cases conducted three years after Ellerth and Faragher found that in all but 
one case, courts held that employers that disseminated an antiharassment policy to all employees 
had satisfied the reasonable care requirement, summarizing,  “the law is relatively clear: a  
so-called ‘good policy’ constitutes “reasonable care.”  David Sherwyn, Michael Heise, & Zev J. 
Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An 
Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual 
Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1290 (2001). 
 173. Sherwyn, supra note 172, at 1290. 
 174. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 944 (N.D. Ind. 2011).  The 
court explained that the reasoning for narrowly applying the Ellerth/Faragher framework was to 
avoid punishing an employer who has satisfied his or her duty to prevent and address harassment.  
Id.  However, the court stated that this rationale applies equally to employers who responded 
promptly after being alerted to harassments in cases involving prolonged harassment, so, 
extended, the argument would suggest dropping the second element whenever the first element is 
met.  Id. at 944–45. 
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III.  TENTH CIRCUIT AND ALALADE COURT CAN BETTER ACCOMPLISH TITLE 
VII’S PREVENTION GOAL BY ENCOURAGING PROMPT REPORTING OF SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT 
The Supreme Court has often repeated that Title VII’s ultimate goal is to rid 
the workplace of discrimination.175  The statutory purpose resonates in the 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, which seeks to eliminate sexual 
harassment by encouraging implementation of employer anti-harassment 
policies by offering an affirmative defense, while also incentivizing employee 
reporting.176  
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits as well as the Alalade court all emphasized 
Title VII’s deterrence goal. 177   However, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ 
elimination of the second element of the defense does not deter sexual 
harassment in the workplace as strongly as the full Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense.178  Under the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ rule, an employee 
who suffers incipient or single-instance harassment may come forward to 
thwart future harassment, but will receive no remedy for the harm already 
suffered if the employer establishes that it responded to the harassment 
promptly and adequately.179  This result serves as a disincentive for employees 
to report harassment, undermines the deterrence goal of Title VII, and prohibits 
Title VII’s goal to provide victims an avenue to recover for their harms.180   
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit’s and the Alalade approach creates an 
incentive for employees to report harassment, because failure to do so shields 
                                                 
 175. See e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995); EEOC 
v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984). 
 176. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (upholding Title VII’s 
“basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by objecting 
employee[s]”); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998). 
 177. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 775 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The underlying 
theme under Title VII is employers should nip harassment in the bud.”); Indest I, 164 F.3d 258, 
365 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he purpose of Title VII, which cannot guarantee civility in the American 
workplace but, at its best, inspires prophylactic measures to deter unwanted sexual harassment.”); 
Aladale, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 945. 
 178. See Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 944–45. 
 179. Id. at 944. 
 180. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual 
Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 726 (2000) (“The typical employee will weigh the 
consequences of reporting against the benefits that will likely accrue to her personally. Because 
she has no incentive to internalize the potential benefits to other employees, the level of reporting 
may be dampened.”).  Grossman argues that the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense itself can 
disincentivize reporting because once an employee fails to report the first incident, he or she will 
be foreclosed from recovering damages and has less reason to file a complaint.  Id. at 721; see 
also Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming 
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 900–05 (2008) (discussing the myriad of reasons why employees do 
not bring harassment charges, including fear of alienation from peers and fear of retaliation from 
supervisors). 
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the employer from liability.181  Title VII’s deterrence goal is accomplished 
more meaningfully when reporting prompts an employer to eliminate sexual 
harassment in its early stages.182 
Indeed, recent studies have shown that less than half of all women who sue 
their employers for sexual harassment report the behavior, 183  a statistic 
attributed to fear of retaliation, general skepticism, and ambivalence towards 
sexual harassment.184  In 2010, at the height of the current economic downturn, 
in which 14 million Americans were unemployed and another 8.8 million were 
underemployed, 185  the reporting problem was exacerbated, leaving sexual 
harassment victims unwilling to leave their jobs and unlikely to risk speaking 
out.186  In light of this, it is even more important for courts to use Title VII as 
an incentive for employees to report sexual harassment, and the Tenth Circuit 
and Alalade court’s approach better encourages reporting by allowing 
employees to recover from employers under Title VII, even when the 
employers have an antiharassment policy in place.187  
                                                 
 181. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 101, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001); Alalade, 796 F. 
Supp. 2d at 945–46. 
 182. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 803–04 (8th Cir. 1999) (Weiner, J., 
specially concurring). 
 183. See, Chamallas, supra note 72, at 374 (citing a recent study of federal workers finding 
that approximately ten percent of employees reported their harassment).  Chamallas also notes 
that, of the employees who sued their employers for harassment, nearly half did not report the 
harassment at first.  Id.; see also MINK, supra note 52, at 77 (noting that an estimated ninety-five 
percent of harassment goes unreported). 
 184. See, e.g., MINK, supra note 52, at 76–77 (discussing the skepticism women face in 
reporting harassment); Saguy, supra note 1, at 81–82 (chronicling the media’s response to sexual 
harassment around the time of Ellerth and Faragher as delegitimizing sexual harassment in “a 
backlash against feminism”). 
 185. Paul Wiseman & Christopher Leonard, Dismal Jobs Data Shakes World Markets, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 5, 2011), available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Dismal 
-jobs-data-shakes-world-apf-1614624743.html. 
 186. Dana Mattoli, More Men Make Harassment Claims, WALL ST. J., March 23, 2010, at 
D4.  Mattoli’s article interviews attorney Greg Grant who explains the problem: 
In the past, victims of harassment—especially men—have ‘voted with their feet’ and 
found new jobs rather than turning to the legal system . . . . When they can’t get other 
jobs and they still have to pay the bills and support families’ they have to either live 
with the harassment or risk the potential stigma of speaking out.   
Id. 
 187. By passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which allowed increased damages for 
discrimination victims, Congress stressed the important role monetary relief plays in encouraging 
victims to file discrimination claims.  Congress explained that victims of intentional 
discrimination would otherwise not be compensated for their injuries nor encouraged to 
“vindicate their civil rights.”  H.R. Rep. 102-40, pt. 2, at 25 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 718.  Some commentators believe that Title VII remedies are ineffective in 
encouraging employees to vindicate their rights, arguing instead for language broadening Title 
VII so all victims can recover from their harasser, instead of just from the employer.  See, e.g., 
Tracy L. Gonos, A Policy Analysis of Individual Liability—the Case for Amending Title VII to 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
After a long struggle, courts finally recognize that Title VII affords 
important protection for employees from sexual harassment by supervisors.188  
The Supreme Court crafted the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to resolve 
the tension between imputing absolute liability on employers under agency 
principles and Title VII’s proscription of strict liability, while at the same time 
promoting Title VII’s goal of eliminating workplace discrimination. 189  
However, currently the Fifth and Eighth Circuits depart from the 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in single- and incipient-harassment 
situations, applying only the first element of the defense.190  In an attempt to 
justify this departure, these circuits arguably overstate the imposition of strict 
liability, and do not meet Title VII’s goal of deterring sexual harassment by 
encouraging employees to report harassment.  The Supreme Court should end 
this departure by articulating that the full Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense 
must be applied in situations of incipient- or single-instance sexual harassment 
cases, as the Tenth Circuit and Alalade court presently do.   Furthermore, given 
the current challenges faced by employee-victims of sexual harassment, the 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense better meets Title VII’s deterrence goal 
by encouraging, rather than foreclosing on, an employee’s ability to recover for 
harms.   This framework provides assurance that Title VII will remain a 
powerful tool to combat sexual harassment in the workplace. 
 
                                                                                                                 
Hold Individuals Personally Liable for Their Illegal Discriminatory Actions, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 265, 281 (1999). 
 188. See supra Part I.B. 
 189. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998). 
 190. See generally supra Part II.B. 
